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NOTE AND COMMENT 
THE NATIONAL .ARMY ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE "DRAFT".-
!n Arver v. U. S., and five similar cases attacking the validity of the so-
called National Army Act of May 18, 1917, Public Statutes, No. 12, 65th 
Congress, c. -, - Stat. -.) the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the 
validity of the Act so far as attacked. The contention that compulsory mil-
itary service as provided in the Act is contrary to our fundamental concep-
tion of the nature of citizenship, and that such compulsion is repugnant to 
a free government and in conflict with the guaran.ties of the Constitution 
as to individual liberty, the Court disposed of summarily and completely 
by pointing out that the power given to Congress to raise armies was plenary, 
subject to no limitations and co-extensive with the same powers possessed 
by other governments. This part of the argument runs largely upon his-
torical grounds. As the Court says, the arguments of the objectors are 
clearly untenable. The contention that even though Congress possesses the 
power to raise armies, its members cannot be sent out of the United States 
without their consent is due, as the court points out, to the wholly inexcus-
able confusion between limitations upon the power of Congress over the 
organized State militia and the power of Congress over such armies as it 
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may raise under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. The ooj ections raised were 
obviously flimsy if not wholly insincere and were based upon no sound legal 
grounds. For this reason, and as the gist of the Court's opinion has been 
made widely known extended comment here is undesirable. The opinion 
of the Court with its marginal notes contains important historical references 
showing that the principle of the Act in question is quite in accord with our 
own colonial and national experience and policies and with that of other 
great nations of the world. 
On the same day in the case of Jones v. Perkins, No. 738, the Court 
affirmed the decision in the similar case in 243 Fed. Rep. 997, in which a 
writ of habeas corpus, asked for on the ground of the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of the Act, was refused, the court merely referring to its reasoning 
and decision in the Arver case as disposing of the contention. 
On June 14th the Court handed down three other opinions touching the 
same act of Congress-that which attracted the greatest public attention, at 
the time of the occurrence involved, being the case of E111111a Gold111a11 and 
Alexander Berkman v. U. S., No. 702, 38 Sup. Ct. 166. The Court reduces 
the numerous contentions of plaintiffs in error to three, of which the first 
is based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the Selective Draft Law. 
Again the Court referred to the Arver case as disposing of this attack. The 
indictment in the Goldman & Berkman Case was under sections of the 
U. S. Criminal Code and charged the unlawful conspiring together and with 
others to induce persons who were under duty to register in accordance 
with the Selective Draft Law to disobey said law by failing to register. The 
second of the contentions is that as the conspiracy was not successful, no. 
crime was committed. But inasmuch as the indictment charged not only 
the conspiring but also the doing of overt acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, this was in and of itself essentially and substantively a crime, pun-
ishable as such without regard to the success or failure of the criminal act. 
This had been established in previous decisions. U. S. v. Rabinowich, 238 
U.S. 78; U.S. v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. U.S., 236 
U. S. 534. The third contention of plaintiffs in error was comprised of 
varied assertions that the evidence did not tend to show guilt, a contention 
which involved inexcusable effort to induce the Supreme Court to invade the 
province of the jury by passing upon the questions of the credibility and the 
weight of evidence. 
Kramer v. U. S., No. 680, 38 Sup. Ct. 168, was disposed of by decisions 
in the Arver and Gold11101i Cases. In Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht and Baker 
v. U. S .. No. 656, 38 Sup. Ct. 168, in addition to points disposed of in the 
Arver Case the plaintiffs in error urged two objections, both of which they 
should have known and probably did know had been adversely disposed of 
by the Supreme Court in numerous earlier cases, They asserted that they 
were Socialists and claimed that the grand and trial jurors were made up 
exclusively of men of other political parties and of property owners. Pre-
cisely the same point in principle had been raised in numerous cases by 
negro defendants who had been tried by juries composed exclusively of 
white men. Such a trial had been pronounced constitutional as long ago as 
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1879. Va. v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 and in a long line of cases 
including Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278. The other objections were even 
more devoid of merit and need not be noticed here. 
The validity of certain methods for administering the Selective Draft 
Law as provided for therein was brought into question in three cases in 
District Courts of the U. S. In Ex Parte Hutflis, 245 Fed. Rep. 7g8, the 
District Court for the '¥estern District of N. Y. sustained by implication 
the provision for the creation of Legal and District Boards to determine all 
questions of exemption and all claims for excluding or discharging individ-
uals or classes from the draft. The relater, who was unable to read or write 
English, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to release him from the 
custody of the military authorities on the ground that though he was an 
alien, through ignorance he had failed to file his claim for exemption within 
the time limited, and that on learning the requirements of the law, after he 
had been accepted for the army, he applied to a Local Board for a form 
upon which to file his claim for exemption, but by mistake was given the 
wrong blank. It resulted from these facts that the petitioner had no hearing, 
that his exemption was not passed upon and that as a result he was subject 
to military authority. though exempted by the terms of the Act and, as he 
claimed, by treaty rights in accordance with the treaty between the United 
States and Austria-Hungary. The court disposed of the treaty claim by 
saying that the Selective Draft Law impliedly exempts aliens who are merely 
denizens of the United States and, moreover, that the Draft Law makes no 
provision for exemption because of treaty rights. Unquestionably this is 
sound. A later act of Congress controls or prevails. Taylor v. lv.lorton, 
2 Curt. C. C. 454, Fed. Cas. No. 13,799; Head Money Cases, II2 U. S. 58o; 
Rainey v. U. S. 232 U. S. 310, 58 L. Ed. 617. The court then made what ap-
pears to be an equitable disposition of the case by refusing to make the 
writ absolute at the time, retaining jurisdiction for ten days to allow an ap-
plication to the Adjutant General for permission to reopen the case before 
the Local Board. 
In United States ex rel Troiana v. Heybum, Sheriff, 245 Fed. Rep. 360, 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pa. refused to issue the writ 
of habeas corpus on behalf of relators who are aliens, who sought by such 
writ in effect to secure a review by the Court of the proceedings of the 
Local Board which had passed upon their claims for exemption. This Court 
too sustained the validity of the Selective Draft Law in providing for the 
Local Board and held that ·the courts would not review the proceedings of 
such tribunals except upon a showing of lack of jurisdiction, usurpation of 
power or arbitrary denial of rights. The court here was upon thoroughly 
established ground. The principle that administrative tribunals may be 
given finality of decision and that the courts will not review their proceed-
ings except in the cases mentioned is too well established to require much 
citation. See, however, U. S. v. ht Toy, lg8 U. S. 253, 49 L. Ed. 1040; 
Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters 524; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; 
B21tterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 48 L. Ed. 525; and article by T. R. 
Pown.r., I Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583. 
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In Ex. Parte Blackillgto11, 245 Fed. Rep. 8o1, a somewhat shocking case 
was presented. Relator had enlisted in the National Guard and was after-
ward drafted into the Federal Service. His petition claims that he was 
below the required height and had other serious physical disqualifications. 
He was favorably passed upon for the National Guard Service by a medical 
officer who was prejudiced against him and who had declared that he would 
"get even" with petitioner for some prior occurrence. Petitioner knew of 
these facts at the time he volunteered and made no objection; but after he 
was drafted into the National Army he consulted other physicians who ad-
vised him th;i.t he could not safely perform military duty. Meantime he had 
been examined and passed upon favorably by the Federal medical officers 
for the National Service and though he endeavored persistently to be dis-
charged therefrom, he failed. The Court dismissed the petition and remand-
ed the petitioner to the military authorities, largely upon the ground that the 
enlistment was voluntary, that neither the party enlisting nor the military au-
thorities occupied a fiduciary relationship with each other, and that the pur-
pose of the examination is not to give to the applicant assurances that he 
is physically fit for military service, but only to prevent undesirable men 
from getting into the army. U. S. v. Cottingham, I Rob. (20 Va.) 615. 
Perhaps this decision was sound. Perhaps there were facts as brought out 
upon the petition and hearing in open court which tended to convince the 
Court t11at petitioner was endeavoring to shirk. But upon the allegations 
of the petition as reported by the Court it would seem that here was a 
case calling for a re-examination, if the law and rules permitted it. 
The objections urged against the Draft Law and its administration in 
all the cases here noted, except the last one, are obviously trivial or worse. 
An examination of the names of the score or more contestants would cause 
one to suspect that in some cases at least their obstructing efforts were part 
of that treacherous hostile propaganda, with which we now know our coun-
try has been menacingly infiltrated, both before and since the beginning of 
the War. The patriotic and clear-visioned pronouncement of our courts 
in these cases is a cause for sincere appreciation and congratulation. 
H. M. B. 
INTERSTA'm COMMERCE CoMMISSION-INTRASTATE RATES.-The marvelous 
:Possibilities for collision between State and Nation involved in our dual 
form of government are nowhere better or more often exhibited than in 
commerce regulation. We have long been learning the definition of the 
commerce which the constitution gives Congress power to regulate. It is 
only recently that we are finding how this power reaches over into purely 
-intrastate business done by a carrier also ·engaged in interstate commerce. 
"!'hat nearly all rail carriers are now engaged in such business, even when 
their lines are wholly intrastate, has been often illustrated under the Second 
Employer's Liability Act. In Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 
Congress was warned off the State preserves, only to prove that the First 
Act was wrong, not in its sweep, but in its failure to save to the states in 
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words what seems lost to them in fact. The Second Act stands, Seco11d 
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. l, and seems to reach practically every 
railway employee, because however much of his time is devoted to purely 
intrastate business, some at least is almost sure to touch interstate traffic, 
and this is enough to bring him under control of Federal law. See the very 
recent case of Cholerton v. D. J. aad C. Ry. (Mich., 1917), 165 N. W. 6o6, 
holding that a track hand of a railroad wholly in the State of Michigan is 
under Federal Act. 
The recent case of Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sioti of llli11ois ( r918), 38 Sup. Ct. 170, illustrates the same collision of State 
and Federal regulation in the field of rate making. This is merely the latest 
in a series of cases before that court. Evidently it is not the last. Of the 
cases already decided we may review a few. The leading case of Smyth 
v. Ames (18g8), 169 U. S. 466, established the general doctrine that State 
Regulation of rates was so connected with interstate rates that no state 
could fix intrastate rates so low as to compel the railroad to recoup state 
losses out of interstate business. This decision might have rested solely on 
the Fourteenth Amendment, on the ground that low rates might amount to 
a practical confiscation of property. It did not even intimate that the Fed-
eral law might directly fix purely intrastate rates. The Minnesota Rate 
Cases, (1913), 230 U. S. 352, 397, 418, 430, raised squarely this question: 
"Was the State debarred from fixing reasonable rates on traffic, wholly 
internal, as to all state points so situated that as a practical consequence 
the carriers would have to reduce the rates they had made to competing 
points without the State, in order to maintain the volume of their inter-
state business, or to continue the parity of rates, or the relation between 
rates as it had previously existed?" The court asserted the plenary power 
of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states, and sweepingly 
held the execution by Congress of this power was "not to be denied or 
thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations." The 
court declined to decide whether Congress might control intrastate rates if 
they tended to give an undue or unreasonable preference to any locality, or 
to unreasonably discriminate between localities in different states. There 
was, however, a strong affirmative inference in various paragraphs of the 
opinion, but the court said if such were the case it "would be primarily 
for the investigation and determination of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and not for the Courts". 
The next year the question actually reached the Supreme Court in the 
Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U. S. 342. Interstate rates between Shreveport, 
La., and Texas points were higher than Texas rates between Dallas and 
Houston, Texas, and the same Texas points, to the evident disadvantage 
of Shreveport. The Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the roads to 
cease and desist from exacting higher rates from Shreveport to Dallas and 
Houston, and intermediate points, than are charged toward Shreveport for 
equal distances. To obey the roads might lower interstate rates, already 
found reasonable by the Interstate Commerce Commission, raise intrastate 
rates, fixed by the Texas Commission, or equalize by changes in each direc-
tion. Whether wisely or not, very naturally the roads chose to raise intra-
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state rates, obeying the Interstate Commission and 1..isobeying the Texas 
Commission. The Supreme Court sweepingly upheld the power of Congress, 
either directly or through a Commission, to control in all matters interstate 
commerce, even to the extent of setting aside intrastate rates fixed by state 
law, when such rates affect interstate commerce. 
This decision was not accepted with good grace by the states. The later 
history of the Shreveport case may be read in Eastem Texas R. R. v. Rail-
road Commission of Te."Cas (1917), 242 Fed. 300, from which it appears that 
the rates were still in dispute three years after the decision. The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota in State v. American Express Co., 161 N. W. 132, 
showed its unregenerate spirit. Arkansas, however, recognized the full 
force of the decision as affecting Arkansas rates discriminating against Mem-
phis, Tenn., St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. State (1917), 197 S. W. l. 
Meantime the South Dakota case reached the U. S. Supreme Court, Amer-
ican Express Co. v. Colwell (1917), 244 U. S. 617, where the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota was administered a mild rebuke for questioning the prin-
ciple after the Shreveport case. As was to be anticipated, the carriers were 
busy trying out the possibilities of the Shreveport decision in relieving them 
from low rates imposed by the States. In South Dakota they had cheerfully 
raised state rates, not merely to the points named in the order of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, but to other points as well. In so far as 
changes had been made beyond the order of the Commission the court found 
them unjustifiable. 
One has only to reflect on the number of cities situated near state boun-
daries to see what a large portion of all intrastate rates might be brought 
under orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Especially is this 
true along the great boundary streams, the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. 
The carriers were not slow to look for holes through the defensive works 
erected by the states about the tariff schedules. The next case involved rates 
between Chicago and points on either side of the Mississippi, especially St. 
Louis, Mo., and East St. Louis, Illinois, and Keokuk, Ia., and Hamilton, Ill. 
Upon complaint of the Business Men's League of St. Louis, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission found that passenger fares between St. Louis and 
Illinois points tributary to St. Louis subject St. Louis to undue disadvantage 
as to East St. Louis and the same Illinois points in so far as the interstate 
mileage rate found to be reasonable, 2.4 cents per mile, exceeded the 2 cent 
rate fixed by the Illinois statute. A Keokuk association and numerous inter-
ested bodies in Illinois intervened. The Commission ordered that on reas-
onably direct lines between Chicago and St. Louis and Chicago and Keokuk, 
rates to Illinois points should be raised to the interstate rate, 41 I. C. C. R. 
13. This order was promptly evaded by the traveling public, by the use of 
two tickets, one at intrastate rates to a point near St. Louis or Keokuk, and 
one at interstate rates for the remaining distance. The Commission accord-
ingly enlarged the order to include such intermediate points. 40 I. C. C. R. 
503. To make a thorough job the railroads concluded the only way to avoid 
discriminations and evasions was to raise all Illinois passenger rates to 24 
cents a mile. This they proceeded to do. It would be but another step to 
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apply the same principle to freight rates and state rate regulation would be 
at an end. 
In Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, 
s11pra, the Supreme Court does not settle this question. It does decide that 
the order actually made by the Commission is so indefinite and uncertain 
as to render it inoperative as to intrastate rates established by the Illinois 
statute. It will never be presumed that "Congress intends to supersede or 
suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where that may 
be done, unless and except so far as its purpose to do so is clearly mani-
fested". The rule that applies to ~ongress governs also an order of a sub-
ordinate agency of Congress, the Commission. It now remains to be seen 
whether the Commission will make a rule so clear as properly to raise the 
question of the Federal power to supersede all state regulation of rates. 
The complications of language in the orders made in the instant case show 
the difficulties in making such an order clear and full without covering all 
state rates. E. C. G. 
AcQUmING JURISDICTION IN GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS.-Garnishment is 
a proceeding provided by statutes found in every state, for the purpose of 
laying hold of something belonging to a defendant or judgment debtor but 
actually in the hands of someone else, and appropriating it to pay the debt 
due from the defendant or judgment debtor. If the proceeding i:; instituted 
ancillary to a pending suit, and before judgment, it is a species of attach-
ment. If it is issued ancillary to a judgment already recovered it is a spe-
cies of execution. If the third person summoned as garnishee is merely 
bailee of property belonging to the judgment debtor or defendant the gar-
nishment differs from an actual levy into the hands of the sheriff under an 
attachment or execution only in the fact that the actual custody and posses-
sion remain with the garnishee instead of passing to the hands of the sheriff. 
If the garnishee has nothing in his hands belonging to the principal defend-
ant and is only indebted to him, the garnishment merely stops payment, cre-
ates a lien on the sum due, and eventually causes the garnishee to pay into 
court for the benefit of the plaintiff instead of paying to the defendant ac-
cording to his original liability. To repeat, it is in substance a seizure of 
the principal defendant's goods or choses in all cases, and appropriation of 
them to satisfaction of his obligations. 
Statement of these aphorisms is prompted by the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in Katt v. Swartz (I9I7), 165 N. W. 717, sustaining a 
plea of payment into court in garnishment as an absolute bar to suit against 
the garnishee by his creditor, and at the same time saying that the judgment 
against the principal debtor (the garnishee's creditor) in the proceedings to 
which the garnishment was ancillary was void because the summons to the 
debtor in that proceeding was issued and served only four days before the 
return day instead of from six to twelve days before, as required by the 
statute. 
The statement of the court that the judgment against the principal de-
fendant was void was not necessary to the decision. The question as to the 
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effect of that adjudication as a judgment ill perso11a111 was not before the 
court. The meaning of the court may fairly be interpreted to be this: ad-
mitting for the sake of argument that the judgment against the principal 
debtor is void as a judgment in personam, it was sufficient to give the court 
jurisdiction iii rem to the extent that the judgment against the garnishee and 
his payment under it divested the principal defendant of his right of action 
against the garnishee. If that was not the meaning of the court, it cer-
tainly is the effect of the judgment; for, as stated in the opening paragraph, 
garnishment is essentially and unavoidably in rem as to the principal de-
fendant's property. 
If the owner of anything is deprived of it by a judicial proceeding to 
which he is in no way a party, he is not bound by the decision. If he has 
not had his day in court the decision is either res inter alias acta or it is 
coram non judice. A corollary of this proposition, admitted by all courts, 
and often declared and applied by the Supreme Court of Michigan, is that 
if the proceeding against the principal defendant is void, payment by the 
garnishee of a judgment rendered against him is no protection to him against 
an action by the principal defendant. Laidlaw v. Marrow, 44 Mich. 547; 
Coe v. Hinkley, 109 Mich. 6o8; Moore v. Speed, 55 Mich. 84-
Therefore, interpreting the instant case in the only way in which it is 
possible to interpret it, it decided that failure to comply with the statutory 
form (in this case relating to the notice to the principal defendant) does 
not render the statutory proceeding in rem void, so as to expose it to col-
lateral attack. Recognizing this fact, we impulsively rise to applause and 
acclamation, as we see the Supreme Court of Michigan turning away from 
the heresy promulgated in this state away back in 1847, in the case of Green-
vault v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, 2 Doug. 498, and wheeling into line 
with the increasing procession following the lead of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States, 
IO Peters 449; Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 3o8; etc. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan was the original sinner, the first state 
to go astray. She has persisted in her error started in 2 Doug. 498 for many 
years, and has misled others. The Supreme Court of Nebraska followed 
her lead for several years, but finally in Daniell v. Mack (18g6), 46 Neb. 740, 
discovered her error and turned to the right. For review of other cases see 
article in 1 MrcH. L. R.i;v. 645, on "Collateral Attacks Based on Irregulari-
ties". Let us hope that the instant case marks a definite change of policy by 
our Supreme Court. The principal debtor in the instant case was personally 
served with summons in the same town in which the suit in garnishment was 
tried, four days before the trial. He had ample opportunity to appear and 
make defense if he had any on the merits or cared to raise objection to the 
jurisdiction; or, as suggested by Mr. Justice S'l'tERI> in his opinion, he might 
have appealed or sued certiorari. He did none of these things, but preferred 
collateral attack. There is no suggestion or suspicion that the length of the 
notice to him caused him any inconvenience or in any way embarrassed his 
defense. On what basis should he be allowed to make collateral attack? 
J. R.R. 
